Journal of Public Economic Theory 26(1) e12664 Feb 2024 [Refereed]
Abstract
By considering combinations of a lump‐sum fee and a per‐unit royalty as licensing schemes in the transfer of new technology through licensing from a technology holder to oligopolistic firms, we investigate stable licensing schemes that a...
Mathematical Social Sciences 86 37-50 Mar 2017 [Refereed]
This paper considers general bargaining outcomes under coalition structures formed by an external patent holder and firms in oligopoly markets, where a coalition structure is eventually determined by the patent holder. Our main proposition is that...
Mathematical Social Sciences 66(3) 183-195 Nov 2013 [Refereed]
By formulating negotiations about licensing payments as cooperative games without side payments, we investigate stable bargaining outcomes in licensing a cost-reducing technology of an external patent holder to oligopolistic firms producing a homo...
Enforsability of non-binding agreements - a game theoretic appproachJapan Society for the Promotion of Science: Grants-in-Aid for Scientific ResearchMUTO Shigeo Takehiko Yamato Ryo Kawasaki Keisuke Bando Ken-ichi Shimomura Shin Kishimoto Changmin Lee Toshiyuki Hirai 
Project Year: Apr 2012 - Mar 2016
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