酒井 啓子

キックオフシンポジウム「日本文明の再構築 : 岩倉使節団150周年に寄せて」, 国際日本文化研究センター, 2023年2月17日-19日

<p>In order to analyse contemporary global crises, it is necessary for scholars of International Relations and Area Studies to overcome two limitations: Area Studies' tendency to focus only on the substance of certain states or areas and the state-centric understanding of International Relations. Contemporary conflicts and faultlines that intermingle and interlock from the local level to the global level cannot be explained simply by unilineal causal relations among the existing actors but rather are complicated by their reciprocal interaction. In order to grasp the widespread networks of co-relationship among various actors, a new analytical framework should be introduced which frames current affairs as the product of a web of interconnections, and as a result of the transformation of those relationships, rather than on the actors' essential qualities.</p><p>As a case study of the above new framework, this paper analyses sectarian "faultlines" in post-war Iraq. Since 2003, violent clashes have occurred in Iraq, which Western media and policy-makers considered to be "sectarian conflicts." As most of the Western policy-makers assume an essentialist understanding of sectarian relations in Iraq, they consider the sectarian factor as an explanatory and independent valuable. However, in order to propose an alternative approach to the perception of sectarian groups as cohesive actors, this paper avoids substantial "sectarian factors" for explanations of conflict in post-2003 Iraq, and focuses instead on the transformation of the various kinds of relationships that led to political and social strife. It sees how sectarian factors emerge as a result of mobilisation of rhetoric and legitimisation of fighting parties.</p><p>This paper analyses media narratives in Iraq and surrounding states. It discloses that pro-government Iraqi media and Iranian media consider IS as inhuman terrorists while Arab and Turkish media as a reflection of anti-government ideology and sentiments in Iraqi society. In the regional power struggle between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, each media, domestic or regional, focuses on the victimhood of their side, and a sectarian narrative further legitimatises the appeal of the victims for their rights. For each side it is not "us" but "others" that discriminate us and exclude us from the Iraqi nation or from the religion of Islam; each side uses sectarian terms to demonise the others, with each insisting that it is "us" who pursue the unity of the community. This paper concludes that the conflicts in post-war Iraq are caused by the competition among the fighting actors over the right to claim the injustice of marginalisation, which often relies on sectarian legitimisation.</p>

Hasty statebuilding in the post-conflict state with introduction of electoral institutions may often accelerate identity politics, if it is composed with multi-ethnic/ religious communities and considered to be still under the process of nation-building. Post-war situation in Iraq can be considered as a case typical where ethic/sectarian cleavages are mobilised when majority systems are introduced instantly through elections. Electoral blocs in the post-war Iraq appear to have been formed along sectarian lines in order to gain a majority of voters collectively, in a situation where most of the major political parties were composed of expatriates and had not yet established nationwide supportive bases inside Iraq. Purpose of this article is to focus on the followings: (1) whether the identity politics along the sectarian cleavage was consolidated, and (2) when and in which circumstances might post-war political identities change among the Iraqi society. In order to clarify the above points, this paper attempts to analyse which factor do the political parties consider as a key social identity that can mobilise majority of the voters in the election.<br>Mobilisation patterns are diverse according to the political parties. UIA relied on Shiite sectarian networks, mainly in the southern governorates. By contrast, Iraqiya succeeded in obtaining a majority of votes in the central regions, where the most of the residents are considered to be Arab Sunnis, not by Sunni sectarianism but by combining various sources of mobilisation, such as tribal, local, kinship networks, through which the fame of candidates was established. Iraqiya emphasises the residents' preferences on their choosing political leaders in each governorate independently. Among them the fame of the candidates is established by their careers in the local communities, either through social services or through activities of regional parties, in the regions which experienced the civil war. Success of Iraqiya in establishing its power base in the middle and northern governorates in Iraq can be ascribed to their absorption of the regional political powers which emerged as a result of the civil war.<br>Conflicting point that the voters matters has shifted from sectarianism to the regional identities, and gap between the central political powers and regional interest became more crucial, not only in the areas where Iraqiya dominates but also among the supporters of UIA, in parallel with the development of national and provincial elections. This paper proposes the necessity of introducing socio-economic analysis based on regional factor, instead of ethno-sectarian presupposition.

2010～ 11年、チュニジアに始まった、路上抗議運動の拡大から政権転覆に至る一連のアラブ諸国における政治変動は、個々の国の政治体制や社会経済的状況、対外関係などにおける固有の要因に基づいて、異なる経過と結果を生んだ。いかなる条件のもとでこうした大規模民衆運動が発生し、いかなる条件で政権交代に至るのかを分析するためには、個々の事例における体制内政治構造と社会運動、および国際関係を複合的に視野にいれることが肝要である。本論では体制政治エリート同盟のあり方と、路上抗議運動のあり方、および国外主体の役割に着目するが、それぞれが相互に影響を及ぼしあうことを前提とし、その影響度合いを「脆弱（敏感）性」と名付ける。その上で、体制エリート同盟と路上抗議運動との間の相互の脆弱（敏感）性、およびそれぞれの国外主体との間の脆弱（敏感）性に応じて、政変の経緯および政権交代後の体制再編のあり方が変化することを論ずる。チュニジア、エジプトの事例では体制エリート同盟および路上抗議運動ともに相互に脆弱であり、かついずれも国外主体（具体的には米政権および国際機関）の動向に敏感であったことで、暴力的衝突や政体の劇的な変質を伴うことなく政権転覆が実現した。そのため政権転覆後の支配的政治エリートにおいても、旧政権下でエリート同盟の辺境におかれた勢力が主流を占めることとなった。他方リビア、シリアの場合はそうした脆弱（敏感）性に基づく関係が体制エリート同盟と路上抗議運動の間に存在しなかったため、衝突は暴力的、長期的なものとなった。両者の事例で政変の成否を決定したのは路上抗議運動が強く脆弱性を持つ国外主体の対応であり、国内主体間に脆弱性が見られない場合には政変の展開に国外要因が重要な役割を果たすことがわかる。従来の政治学ではアラブ動乱を十分分析できたとは言い難く、体制論、社会運動論、国際関係論と細分化された諸分野を総合的に組み合わせて分析する枠組みの開発が必要である。本論はそのための一試論である。

特集1: 中東から変わる世界 (第I部:「アラブの春」にいたる流れと世界への波及)

Purpose of this paper is to see how incumbent regimes attempt to utilise the introduction of an electoral system to curb challengers' will to oppose the regime and to incorporate some of them into the existing elite circles. The process of elections as well as the nomination of the ministers in Iraq under Saddam Husayn shows the pattern how the incumbent regimes embrace social forces into the current political system. A mechanism for the cooptation of potential political elites was established under Saddam's regime, reflecting his policy to rely on a coalition-like ruling system among the local groups from Upper Tigris, Middle Tigris, and Upper Euphrates. The political aspirations of these local groups in the northwestern areas were first stimulated by military involvement in politics beginning in the 1940s, and subsequently revived when Iraq was forced to expand its army to fight the war against Iran. Saddam used this cooptation network as a substitute for the party hierarchy, but it was only applied in the northwerstern area, not in the southern part of Iraq. This geographic coincidence between the range of alliance of political elites under Saddam's regime and the so-called "Sunni Triangle" led to a reduction of the nature of the regime to the sectarian factor of "sunni-ness."

Women in Iraq have been always at the &ldquo;periphery&rdquo; of the multi-layered centre/periphery structures. They were located at the periphery of the traditional Muslim/Arab society in a Western/modernist sense. Iraq itself, on the other hand, is located at the periphery of the colonial and global economic system. Consequently, Iraqi women have found themselves in a double peripheral position, both at the international as well as the domestic level.<br>The leftist political elites who became dominant in Iraq after 1958 understood the liberation of women as evidence of the progressiveness of modern society, as they opposed both feudalism and Western colonialism. The state under the Ba'thist regime in the 1970s controlled women's organizations and included them in the system of revolutionary mobilization. State control was strengthened during the war period in the 1980s as a means to mobilise women into the labour force.<br>The leftist regimes in Iraq pursued this secular and de-Islamisation policy until after the Gulf war, but in the 1990s Saddam Hussein introduced a re-tribalisation and re-Islamisation policy as a means to compensate for the state's lack of ability to govern local society. This revival of traditional Muslim and tribal social systems drove women again to the periphery.<br>The US invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam's regime has led to a change in the previous central/peripheral relationship. Iraq was placed at the periphery of the world political system under US/UK control. At the same time, the new Iraq regime, established following the general election in 2005, is led by Islamist political parties, which were in a peripheral/outlaw position in Iraq before 2003. Under this new situation, women have been divided into three categories. First, there is a group who utilise the US/Western support to &ldquo;liberate/democratise&rdquo; Iraq and demand the introduction of a Western legal and social system to protect women's rights. A second group accepts the newly introduced Western electoral system but not the Western-type equal political rights for women. The third are women members of Islamist political parties, who act as a part of the revolutionary forces pursuing the establishment of an Islamic state.<br>Under both the leftist and Islamist regimes, revolutionaries have consistently pursued their own goal of &ldquo;liberating&rdquo; their nation from the rule of the &ldquo;centre&rdquo; of world politics, which is led by the Western system; sometimes they play up the nominal status of women to the state elites, but in other cases pursue their own aims at the expense of women's rights.

The Iraq War was a typical case of military intervention aimed at bringing about a regime change in a hostile state. The Bush administration had regarded Saddam's regime in Iraq as a threat to US security since 2001 and decided to bring about a regime change by force in 2003, with the collaboration of Iraqis expatriates. The US was neither the first nor the only foreign power to be invited to intervene in Iraqi domestic political rivalry. Opposition groups such as the Islamists and Arab Nationalists who had been sponsored in Iran and Syria, had a long history of making use of their host states' desire to interfere in Iraqi domestic politics. In contrast, the US administration after the Gulf War, was reluctant to recruit from existing Iraqi opposition groups in Iraq as agents of intervention; instead the US explored new sources of collaborators from independent Iraqis in exile, such as Ahmad al-Chalabi of the INC.<br>After the INC failed to unite the whole opposition movement abroad, the Bush administration renewed its efforts to support Iraqi opposition groups by passing the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998. On the basis of provisions set out in this Act, the US started to openly finance Iraqi opposition groups including the SCIRI-hardline Islamists hosted by Iran since 1982. It was clear that the SCIRI and other political opposition groups with a domestic power base played a more crucial role inside Iraq in putting pressure on the regime, than the expatriates groups which had no power base in Iraq. Rivalry between expatriate and domestic-based Islamists intensified when the Pentagon simply decided to make al-Chalabi the post-War Iraqi leader, abandoning the idea of setting up a government-in-exile in preparation for the post-Saddam era. SCIRI and other Islamists in exile, such as the al-Da'wa Party overtly criticised the US military occupation, and reestablished their power bases by means of their religious networks in Iraq. They also had to compete for popular support with the indigenous Islamic movements led by Muqtada al-Sadr and the followers of Ali al-Sistani.<br>In due course the SCIRI and al-Da'wa started to split from other pro-US political groups when they took part in the first election for the National Assembly in 2005. They broke with the post-war strategy planned by the US by forming a Shiite coalition under the auspices of al-Sistani. For them the US military intervention was nothing more than a tool to topple Saddam's regime, and it was they who had accomplished the final stages of regime change-not as the US had intended but in a way consistent with their own political aims.

Secularisation and Westernisation/ modernisation of the 1930-40 period affected the Muslim society in the Middle East and caused two types of reaction. One is popularisation of the crisis of Islam, i.e., the spread of the consciousness of the fear for losing the existing value system. It was a rather general phenomenon in the entire Middle Eastern Muslim society. The second reaction was from the narrower community of 'ulamā' al-dīn, who feared the loss of their traditional position in society. This was more apparent in academic hierarchy among Shi'i 'ulamā'. Muhammad Bāqir al-Sadr developed his Islamic thought reflecting on these two waves. His aims were (1) to activate Islamic political movements in the framework of the moderntype of political parties (institutionalising political movement), and (2) to modernise and institutionalise marja'i¯ya instead of individual marja'i¯ya. The first aim was pursued in the context of the enlargement of the broader Islamic political activities including laymen. The second aim, on the other hand, involved regulation and systematisation of the intervention of 'ulamā' in politics, which had been observed in a sporadic and individual way through out the history of Shi'i marja'i¯ya. al-Da'wa was designed to achieve both purposes. Though it was established parallel to marja'īya and most of its founding members were from hawza, political circumstances forced them to withdraw from the party. Consequently, supremacy of the laymen was established in the leadership of al-Da'wa in the 1970s, and they introduced the organisational set-up, election system and internal regulation after loss of their sole marja'. This process led the party to the separation of political leadership from marja'īya. We may consider the feature of al-Da'wa as a symbol of modernity, and that it represents the ideological aspect of marja'i¯ya. In contrast to political development of al-Da'wa, other Islamic organisations such as 'Amal and SCIRI are rather inclined to depend on social networks of marja'īya in their activities. This is a part of the reason why they do not name themselves as a "party"; indeed for them it is rather important to enter the political sphere without using a name of "party" which carries with it imported Western images. This pattern in the Islamic movement emphases the effectiveness of the traditional network of 'ulamā' or sayyids based on their sacredness, nobility of origin, or salvation of the soul. It can be acknowledged as an extension of the traditional social welfare network of marja'i¯ya. To conclude from what al-Da'wa and SCIRI could achieved, it is clear that the effort to institutionalise the political party was successfully accomplished but the institutionalisation of marja'īya is yet to be achieved. This does not mean, however, that the attempt for institutionalisation of marja'īya has abandoned. If we believe what is reported on the assassination of Sadiq al-Sadr, there remain still some forces to proceed with the reform movements of marja'īya inside Iraq. Shubbar suggests that the delay of political movements among Shi'i is because of the presence of marja'īya, and that after 40 years of experimentation with the political party idea we again see marja'iya working as an alternative to the immobilised political parties.